Is ars an intellectual virtue? John Buridan on craft by Ramos, Aline Medeiros
275© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
I. Chouinard et al. (eds.), Women’s Perspectives on Ancient and Medieval 
Philosophy, Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 24, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73190-8_19
Chapter 19
Is Ars an Intellectual Virtue? John Buridan 
on Craft
Aline Medeiros Ramos
Abstract Scholarship on the philosophy of the Late Middle Ages has tended to 
overlook certain subject matters, especially some pertaining to ethics and political 
philosophy. My object of study in this paper is one of these overlooked notions, the 
idea of craft (ars) as an intellectual virtue. While recent publications have focused 
on sapientia, and scientia, this paper aims to rehabilitate ars as a virtue, in particular 
John Buridan’s understanding of craft as an intellectual virtue in his Quaestiones 
super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum. My goal is to examine 
Buridan’s analysis of craft as expounded in this commentary. Once the Picardian 
master’s theses have been presented, and the objections he raises have been reviewed 
along with the solutions proposed to those objections, I briefly suggest why craft 
might have been overlooked as a virtue.
Keywords Buridan · Craft · Virtues · Medieval ethics · Intellectual virtues · 
Factive intellect · Scholasticism
19.1  Introduction
Given its vast corpus and thematic diversity, it is no surprise that the current scholar-
ship on the philosophy of the Late Middle Ages has tended to overlook certain 
subject matters, especially some pertaining to ethics and political philosophy. A 
conspicuous example of this is attested to in the recent research on scholastic virtue 
theory: whereas in the last few decades there has been increasing interest in the 
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discussion concerning virtues and habitus1—and, more specifically, epistemic vir-
tues such as sapientia2 and scientia,3—one intellectual virtue, namely craft (ars),4 
seems to be consistently overlooked,5 perhaps due to its status as a “minor” or “sub-
ordinate” virtue.6 While this article does not purport to offer ars full historical 
reparations, it intends to rehabilitate it as an intellectual virtue worthy of 
consideration, and note some aspects of its importance to the general scheme of 
virtues in scholasticism. To that end, I discuss the status of craft as an intellectual 
virtue in John Buridan’s (c. 1300–c. 1361) philosophy, namely in his long commen-
tary on the Nicomachean Ethics.7
1 See, e.g., Faucher & Roques (2018).
2 See, e.g., Saarinen (2006) and Hibbs (2001).
3 See, e.g., Pasnau (2010) and Biard (2012).
4 For the purposes of this paper, unless otherwise noted, I will be translating the Latin term “ars,” 
which in the Aristotelian context corresponds to the Greek τέχνη, as “craft,” for I believe it cap-
tures the discussion at hand better than the direct cognate “art.” Note, however, that the idea 
expressed by its adjectival correlate (viz. artifex) used throughout the text will be “skilled.”
5 The notable exception being Craemer-Ruegenberg and Speer’s Scientia und ars im Hoch- und 
Spätmittelalter (1994). Although their book approaches the subject matter very broadly, ars is 
rarely taken merely as the virtue but rather in contexts where it stands as near-synonym to scientia, 
namely as a set of scientific-philosophical disciplines—such as when it is used in the contraposi-
tion of the artes liberales to the artes mechanicae, or the discussion about which discipline ought 
to be called “ars artium.” Another book which could be considered an exception is Chandelier, 
Verna and Weill-Parot’s (2017) Science et technique au Moyen Âge (XIIe–XVe siècles), but it is my 
understanding that only Robert’s (2017) article in that volume actually lives up to the strictly philo-
sophical questions to which the title of the book may lend itself.
6 It is interesting to note that ars did not figure among the three intellectual virtues in the arts mas-
ters’ commentaries on the Ethica vetus and Ethics nova (i.e., Ethics commentaries written until the 
first half of the thirteenth century), which were restricted namely to intelligentia, sapientia and 
fronesis/prudentia. With the development of Ethics commentaries based on the whole of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, following the appearance of Herman the German’s paraphrasis of Moerbeke’s 
translation to the ten books and the reestablishment of Aristotle’s five intellectual virtues as scien-
tia, intellectus, prudentia, sapientia and ars, the first of these was given a prominent position in 
subsequent debates, whereas the last continued to be somewhat neglected. On the intellectual vir-
tues according to the arts masters in the first half of the thirteenth century, see Zavattero (2007, 
pp. 49–51), and Lafleur (1994, pp. 59–60).
7 Considering that there is currently no published modern edition of this text, critical or otherwise, 
all citations to the Latin text will be my transcriptions from the manuscripts. For the purposes of 
this paper, I have used mainly MS. Vat. urb. 198, for, comparing it with collations from other books 
of Buridan’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, this seems to be a reliable manuscript, con-
taining no important omissions or significant errors. The collation I have used to compare to mine 
was R. J. Kilcullen’s “Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, book 10: Corrected text,” from 1996/1999, 
a careful edition and detailed collation of 8 manuscripts and 2 early printed editions of Book X of 
Buridan’s Ethics, which was used as the basis for McGrade’s, Kilcullen’s, and Kempshall’s trans-
lation of the text, published in 2000 as “Jean Buridan: Questions on Book X of the Ethics” in The 
Cambridge translations of medieval philosophical texts. The collation and Latin edition, which 
have not been published, used to be available on Kilcullen’s personal webpage (http://www.
humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/). Unfortunately, this work is no longer available online.
All punctuation marks and emphasis present in the transcribed Latin text are my own.
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In what follows, after a succinct presentation of some background discussions on 
τέχνη/ars, I will outline Buridan’s view of craft, focusing on question 8 of Book VI 
of his Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum.8 
Although Buridan’s text follows the standard format of a scholastic question,9 I will 
present a restructured version of the text for the benefit of the reader. I will start by 
expounding the Picardian arts master’s theses and supporting arguments, sparingly 
comparing and contrasting them with other medieval authors’ wherever such com-
parisons might prove useful: I will rely on excerpts by Thomas Aquinas 
(1225–1274)10 and Radulphus Brito (c. 1270–c. 1320).11 Although many similarities 
can be noted between Buridan and Brito—as is to be somewhat expected, given how 
Buridan, a maître ès arts himself, is inscribed in a long tradition of Parisian arts 
masters,12—for the sake of conciseness, I will not thoroughly address those similari-
ties in this paper. Once Buridan’s own reasoning is fully laid out, I will present a 
series of possible objections Buridan raises to his own thesis that craft is a virtue, 
and explain how he responds to each, with the addition of a few further clarifications 
to the main theses. Finally, in my concluding remarks, I will address a few issues 
concerning how craft ranks among virtues and propose a very brief assessment of 
what could be gained were it afforded a more systematic study.
On the subject of craft, Eustratius of Nicaea (c. 1050–c. 1120), one of the great-
est authorities on Aristotelian ethics, wrote that
No one at all having reason can ignore what craft is, since it is a collection of discovered 
comprehensions, exercised and tested to some good end of the life of those who have rea-
son. Indeed, that definition makes clear that craft has as its end some good, and that this end 
is good and useful to human life. (In Ethicam Nicomacheam I 1, 23–28; my translation)13
This passage testifies to medieval and ancient philosophical authorities having a 
very different notion of craft from the one we currently have. While our understand-
ing of craft14 might not lend it an important philosophical status and certainly not 
warrant it a place among virtues, the very first pages of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
paints a completely different picture:
8 Henceforth, QNE. All translations from Buridan’s QNE used here are my own.
9 In its original form, the text opens with objections, which are followed by a counter-argument 
appealing to the authority of Aristotle, followed by Buridan’s own theses. Only after his thesis has 
been thoroughly explained does Buridan, at the very end of the quæstio, take the time to respond 
to the initial objections.
10 Especially ST I-II, q. 57, a. 3.
11 Questiones super librum Ethicorum Aristotelis, q. 140.
12 Here, I am thinking of Radulphus Brito, Giles of Orleans and numerous “anonymous” (i.e., 
unidentified) arts masters, such as the so-called “anonymous of Erlangen.”
13 Eustratius (1973, p. 9), in Grosseteste’s Latin translation: “Quid quidem est ars, nullus omnino 
rationis particeps ignorat quoniam est collectio ex adinventis comprehensionibus, exercitatis et 
probatis ad aliquem finem bonum eorum quae in vita. Et haec enim definitio manifestat artem 
finem habentem bonum aliquod. Hunc autem ad humanam vitam bonum et utilem.”
14 Either as the dexterity involved in skilled labour for which one has trained (maybe even a trade) 
or as a type of skill tantamount to guile (as when we call someone “crafty”).
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[…] science and craft come to men through experience; for “experience made craft,” as 
Polus says, “but inexperience luck.” Now craft arises when from many notions gained by 
experience one universal judgement about a class of objects is produced. For to have a 
judgement that when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good, and similarly in the 
case of Socrates and in many individual cases, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it 
has done good to all persons of a certain constitution, marked off in one class, when they 
were ill of this disease, e.g. to phlegmatic or bilious people when burning with fevers—this 
is a matter of craft. (981a; trans. 1924, with minor changes)
In agreement with Aristotle’s description in the Metaphysics and in the Nicomachean 
Ethics (e.g. 1139b–1140a), in the Middle Ages, craft is a broad concept which goes 
far beyond what is acquired through the practice of medicine to include dispositions 
related to architecture, shipbuilding, agriculture, warfare, trade, mantic activities 
(such as necromancy or witchcraft), rhetoric, and dialectic, to name just a few. How, 
then, should we understand what craft is and the role it plays in relation to, say, sci-
ence? Can they coincide? If we rely on this Aristotelian understanding of craft 
(broader than our current understanding), could we still agree with Aristotle (NE 
1139b) that craft should be counted among the five intellectual virtues?
In light of these questions and the course of examination I set out to follow 
above, what I present here is a view of craft which is mostly of historical interest to 
philosophers, but the problems raised in the medieval discussion could certainly 
prove to be more broadly thought-provoking, if one were to consider it in the con-
text of current debates on technology and its uses in society.
19.2  Buridan: Ars Is a Virtue
In QNE VI 8, Buridan examines the question of whether craft is a virtue. Although 
Aristotle had listed craft among the five intellectual virtues in NE 1139b, we seem 
to have a good number of reasons to think that craft is not a virtue: craft looks more 
like a power or a capacity than a virtue (Sect. 19.3.1); sometimes it seems to be in 
our best interest that craft be limited or forbidden (which is not the case with any 
other virtue) (Sect. 19.3.2); it is not perfective like other virtues, in the sense that it 
does not perfect human activity, but merely guarantees that the end product of the 
activity is good (Sect. 19.3.3), and also in the sense that it does not seem to perfect 
us in the same way as other virtues do (i.e., making us good) (Sect. 19.3.4); and if 
we say that there is a virtue of craft, as one would, then craft cannot be a virtue 
(Sect. 19.3.5). Before looking at these objections, we should first state that Buridan’s 
main argument in this quaestio is that ars is indeed a virtue. He proposes two theses 
to support that claim: “First, that every craft is a virtue of some sort. Second, that no 
craft is a virtue of a human being as a human being.”15 Although Buridan parses out 
his two theses one at a time, as we will see below, they must be understood as 
15 “Dicenda sunt duo. Primo, quod omnis ars est virtus quaedam. Secundo, quod nulla ars est virtus 
hominis secundum quod homo.”
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necessarily intertwined. The two theses could be translated into a single proposi-
tion, namely that craft is a virtue (and an intellectual one at that) because it is the 
habitus of the internal work of the factive intellect. This single proposition more 
clearly translates the two theses above when we add emphasis to different parts of 
the statement:
(T1) Every craft is a virtue of some 
sort.
= Craft is a virtue because it is the habitus of the 
internal work of the factive intellect.
(T2) No craft is a virtue of a human 
being qua human being.
= Craft is a virtue because it is the habitus of the 
internal work of the factive intellect.
This difference in emphasis will be clarified in the two subsections that follow.
19.2.1  First Thesis: Every Craft Is a Virtue of some Sort
As a reaction to the presentation of the first thesis, we might ask ourselves what 
exactly Buridan means by “every craft is a virtue of some sort,” i.e., why Buridan 
formulates it in that way, instead of simply saying that craft is a virtue. As Buridan 
will explain in his response to the objections to his theses—and as had been said in 
Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics (1106a)—a virtue is that by which a person 
becomes good, and which renders their work equally good.16 So, for craft to be 
considered a virtue, it has to fit that description, i.e., perfect the person having it and 
render their work good as well. And it does just that, according to Buridan;17 there-
fore, it is a virtue. But we still need to examine how and in what sense craft accom-
plishes those feats. The first thing to consider here is how craft perfects us or makes 
us better. Surely craft cannot perfect us in a moral sense. We do not become morally 
good (or better) because of becoming skilled in craft: craft, on its own, is morally 
neutral (Robert 2017, p. 62). This must be considered in light of the compelling 
objections Buridan faces, which seem to demonstrate that even if craft has good 
work as its result—where “good” is understood as that which is in accordance with 
an end considered to be fitting by the intellect—it does not necessarily perfect us 
(see Sect. 19.3.4 below); so against Buridan’s claim, one of the two conditions 
above seems not to be met. In order to understand how Buridan manages to demon-
strate that one may be perfected by craft, we must understand more thoroughly how 
craft works, so to speak.
16 “Prima conclusio sic probatur: virtus definitive vel descriptive est qui habentem perficit et eius 
opus bene reddit, ut patet secundo huius.”
17 “Sed omnis ars est huiusmodi [i.e., habentem perficit et eius opus bene reddit].”
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Craft, argues the Picardian arts master, perfects us according to the settled dispo-
sition we acquire through its activity,18 namely through an intellectual activity of the 
factive intellect (intellectus factivus), which becomes productive. Indeed, one of the 
first things Buridan explains in his responsio is that craft is proper to the factive 
intellect, which it perfects. He says,
[…] the work of the factive intellect as factive is twofold, namely: internal and external. 
Internally, it is the ratiocination aiming at a judgment about things that can be made, [and] 
the goodness of this work is the truth towards which a craft determines the factive intellect. 
(QNE VI 8)19
Internally, then, the work of the factive intellect is properly intellectual: it makes 
judgments about things that can be made (factibilia) in view of good work, which is 
related to the truth as the result of reasoning well. Craft is an intellectual virtue in 
that it actually determines or directs the factive intellect toward this truth. Externally, 
when put into effect and acting, for instance, upon the will and eventually causing 
the subject to make something in a certain way (acting “factively,” so to speak, on 
matter), the work of the factive intellect is regulated by its internal work, which 
ultimately means that the work of the factive intellect is dependent on craft either 
18 This is in accordance with the general argument made in QNE VI 1. Cf., especially: “Hec autem 
que sic dicta sunt, licet habeant apparentiam, tamen non ex toto vera esse videntur, oportet enim 
ponere differentiam inter habitus et actus illos ex quibus generantur. Videmus ergo quod actus 
appetitus sive eliciti, sive imperati non generantur per assuetudinem, sed sunt semper in nostra 
potestate obiecto presente et cognito et non interueniente impedimento extrinseco. Habitus autem 
in appetitu nostro generantur ex assuetudine. Pro tanto quia non firmantur et perficiuntur in nobis, 
nisi per actuum frequentationem, hoc enim vocamus ex assuetudine generari. Ita etiam videtur 
quod in intellectu actuales conclusionum aut principiorum noticie non ex assuetudine, sed per 
experientiam, vel doctrinam, vel huiusmodi viam aliam generantur. Habitus tamen qui cessante 
actuali consideratione maneret nonsic, sed firmantur et perficiuntur per frequentatem consideratio-
nem, propter quod videmus multos acutissimi ingenii nunquam ad habitum posse peruenire, quia 
nolunt illam noticiam quam per doctrinam cito et faciliter capiunt frequentare, de quibus dicitur 
communiter quod quicquid per unam aurem intrat exit per alteram. Videtur ergo quod universaliter 
habituum generatio proprie sive in appetitu, sive in intellectu sit per assuetudinem, hoc est per 
actionum seu operationum frequentationem multiplicatam vel si quis dicat quod per quemlibet 
actum, etiam per primum aliquid ipsius, habitus acquiritur tamen sine assuetudine, hoc est sine 
actus frequentatione, nec in appetitu, nec in intellectu habitus firmatur et perficitur. Quod autem 
nos dicimus scientiam acquiri per doctrinam sic habet veritatem, quia ipsa nobis acquiritur per 
frequentationem actuum qui per doctrinam generantur. Ex quo patet quod rationes precedentis 
opinionis nihil interimunt eorum que nunc dicta sunt. Nam a principio nos conclusionibus aut 
principiis assentimus per ratiocinationem aut experientiam. Et cum huiusmodi ratiocinationes et 
experientias frequentamus, habitus quidem firmatur in nobis, quo quando volumus prompte ratio-
cinamur. Et quo conclusionem cui sepe per ratiocinationem adhesimus, etiam sine actuali ratione 
concedimus. Unde concedendum est quod dubiis acquiescere propter consuetudinem acquisitam 
non ex frequenti ratiocinatione, sed ex frequenti audire tantum, nonest prudentie, propter quod 
Aristoteles non immerito ratiocinationem extollit. Dicendum est igitur ad questionem propositam 
quod divisio virtutum humanarum in virtutes intellectuales et virtutes morales appetibiles est bona 
quod satis apparet in opinione precedente.”
19 “Opus autem intellectus factivi ut factivus duplex est, scilicet interius et exterius. Interius est 




way: directly, when it is internal; and indirectly through the internal work, when it 
is external—for the goodness of the external work begins in the goodness (and 
truth-directedness) of the internal work (QNE VI 8).20
The internal work of the factive intellect can be understood as the role of the 
director (dirigens) in the know-how of a craftsmanship, while the external work 
corresponds to that of the agent as a doer or maker (agens).21 While the former 
directs or guides the external work of the factive intellect, the latter inclines us (i.e., 
our will and, ultimately, our bodies) to the action resulting in production. For craft 
to be a virtue, it requires both sides of the work of the factive intellect: the external 
one guarantees its execution so that it can become a settled disposition (i.e., a habi-
tus), while the internal one situates its intellectual-ness and truth-directedness, thus 
allowing for it to be a virtue in the sense of it being an “excellence,” i.e., in the sense 
of it perfecting the agent.22 This is how we can get all elements needed to call craft 
a virtue, i.e., a settled disposition inclining to excellence. This is in line, e.g., with 
Albert’s understanding of craft requiring both a habitus factivus and a ratio certa, or 
the idea of craft as a habitus factivus cum ratione.23
If craft is to be deemed a virtue proper to the factive intellect and, more specifi-
cally, dependent on the internal work of the factive intellect, that means it is a spe-
cific kind of intellectual habitus: a factive habitus. The idea of a factive habitus as a 
habitus of the factive intellect is not something we find explained across the board 
in scholastic philosophy, but it is something Aquinas24 and Radulphus both deal 
with and describe more thoroughly than Buridan, who seems to only take it for 
granted. According to Radulphus,
[…] indeed, craft is a true habitus and a factive habitus, because it is about operations going 
over to external matter, and such is a factive habitus; and active and factive habitus differ 
because the active habitus is about operations that do not go over to external matter, but 
which remain in the agent, but the factive habitus is about operations that go over to exter-
nal matter, and craft is like that. (Questiones super librum Ethicorum Aristotelis, q. 140 
(Book VI); my translation and italics)25
20 “Opus autem exterius ab interiori opere natum est regulari. Ideo et eius bonitas nata est, ortum 
habere a bonitate operis interioris, propter quod Aristoteles vult quod ars reddit opus intellectus 
factivi bonum et bene se habens.”
21 This terminology is borrowed from Robert’s (2017) examination of Albert’s notion of craft.
22 More specifically, the agent’s factive intellect, as the next section will show.
23 Albert, Super Ethica VI 6. On Albert’s understanding of craft and some comparisons between his 
and Buridan’s ideas, see Robert (2017), esp. pp. 53–63.
24 E.g., Aquinas, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, ch. 2.
25 “[…] ita ars est habitus verus et est habitus factiuus, quia est circa operationes transeuntes in 
materiam exteriorem, et talis <est> habitus factiuus; <quia in hoc differunt habitus actiuus et fac-
tiuus, quia habitus actiuus> est circa operationes non transeuntes in materiam exteriorem sed rema-
nentes in agente, sed habitus factiuus est circa operationes transeuntes in materiam exteriorem, 
cuiusmodi est ars” (ed. 2008, p. 490).
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Craft is therefore peculiar because as a habitus it is not only directed at truth, as is 
the case with all other intellectual habitus, but it also gets translated or rendered into 
external matter, according to or following the internal work of the factive intellect.
Although Buridan does not talk about factive habitus specifically in his corpus, 
if we understand the factive habitus as the result of the work of the factive intellect, 
he would seem to understand the factive habitus differently from how Radulphus 
does above, because of his twofold understanding of the work of the factive 
intellect:26 as I have suggested above, for Buridan, just as for Albert, the factive 
habitus requires both “action” and “production” while for Radulphus, only the 
operations carried over to external matter would allow for a factive habitus to be 
begotten.
Moreover, as has been suggested above, it is in our proper understanding of the 
structure of craft and how it relates to the intellect that we can fully grasp the sense 
in which it is an intellectual virtue. When we think about the artes, it is usual to 
observe in the scholastic framework that some are called mechanical and some are 
called liberal. The former are those whose end is work, i.e., “production” or “mak-
ing,” leading to the accomplishment of an external work or result (in our example of 
the ars domificatoria, the external work accomplished would be a house), and the 
latter are those whose end is activity,27 leading to the production of a different kind 
of outcome, for instance, truth. The subject matter of the so-called liberal (or “free-
born”) artes is some agent’s intellect: what undergoes change in the case of the 
liberal arts is not some kind of external matter, but the agent’s own soul. Thus, lib-
eral arts, falling under the category of craft, also produce something good, namely 
in perfecting someone’s intellect through learning. And even though in this latter 
case the external work is not material in the same sense as in the ars domificatoria, 
for instance, both cases rely on a presupposed internal work, directed to truth.
The internal work of craft is thus to refer that intellect to the true and good, 
directing the agent in their work with right reason. Although the internal work of 
craft might seem worthier of the name “virtue” than the external work, which could 
be compared to the work of chance (in that it may or may not follow what is pro-
posed by its internal correlate), that is not really the case. First, because, whereas the 
effects of mere chance are fleeting, in both kinds of artes something remains, firmly: 
the transformation of the material object is only evidently perceived in the case of 
mechanical crafts, but the disposition to being directed to the right kind of intellec-
tual activity is settled in both cases—the exemplary case being that of the liberal 
arts, whereby we acquire a mental habitus directing us to reason truly. And second, 
because the external work requires or depends on the internal work,28 and is thus 
likewise mediated by and requires its truth-directedness.
26 See n. 19 above.
27 The distinction between “production” (sometimes referred to as “effection”) and “activity” con-
cerns particular aspects of an operation. The former refers to what properly pertains to craft, and 
the latter refers to the kind of operation more commonly associated with prudence, their pre-
operative correlates being the factibilia and agibilia, respectively.
28 See n. 20 above.
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Thus, craft, regardless of its being taken as an ars mechanica or an ars liberalis, 
is involved in the perfection and truth-aiming of the factive intellect. And this brings 
us to another standard definition of virtue that one would find in other questions, if 
one were to systematically examine the whole of Buridan’s colossal commentary on 
the Ethics: that virtue is also defined by being the cause of the best work of which a 
power is capable.29 If we consider along with that what has just been said about the 
factive intellect—that it ought to reason correctly about things that can be made—
then craft seems to determine the (factive) intellect, directing it to its best work 
(QNE VI 8).30 Thus, craft would fulfil the two conditions mentioned above (namely, 
make someone good and render their work good) and qualify as a virtue of some 
sort, especially with respect to its internal work.
19.2.2  Second Thesis: No Ars Is a Virtue of a Human Being 
as a Human Being
The second thesis, which, as I have suggested, presents itself as a sort of comple-
mentary reiteration of the first, helps us further understand why craft is a virtue of 
some sort, and not simply a virtue without further qualification, and how it can still 
be counted among human virtues even if it is not a virtue of humans qua humans. 
Here, Buridan turns to Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics (1152b) and to the 
distinction between human beings who are good secundum quid and those who are 
good simpliciter. Indeed, as we have seen, craft does not make humans good abso-
lutely. It only seems to make good craftspeople or artisans, for even through the 
craft of building, as Buridan says, one can build a house badly on purpose, or one 
can build houses which are good, firm and beautiful, but for bad reasons and/or with 
bad aims (QNE VI 8).31 Here we can think of a contractor commissioned to build 
concentration camps knowingly: even if the buildings perfectly suit their purpose 
29 See, for instance, Buridan, QNE VI 9: “[…] ut dicitur primo de Caelo, ideo etiam dicitur septimo 
Physicorum quod ‘virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum,’ scilicet ad optimum (eius) opus, sed 
quaedam animae potentia est intellectus practicus seu activus […]”; and QNE VII 5: “Item, scien-
dum est quod virtus dupliciter accipitur: uno modo proprie, scilicet pro habitu perfecto, videlicet 
inclinante et determinante potentiam ad optimum opus in quod ipsa potest; alio modo large, pro 
quolibet habitu inclinante et determinante potentiam ad opera laudabilia” (emphasis mine). This 
idea can be originally traced back to Aristotle, EE 1218b.
30 “Item virtus attenditur secundum maximum et optimum opus in quod potentia potest, at intel-
lectus factivi, secundum quod est factivus est verum dicere circa factibilia et ad hoc ars determinat 
intellectum igitur.”
31 “Secunda conclusio probetur sic. Illa non est virtus hominis secundum quod homo, quae non 
reddit hominem bonum hominem simpliciter, et patet secundo huius [sic], sed ars non reddit homi-
nem simpliciter bonum hominem: quia multi sunt docti artifices et experti, qui sunt mali homines. 
Puta intemperati aut iniusti: nec mirum quia per artem domificatoriam et secundum artis exigen-
tiam potest domus fieri in se bona, firma et pulchra propter malum finem, sicut propter bonum, et 
ita male humana malitia.”
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and follow the tenets of good architecture and engineering, the builder will not be 
considered a virtuous human being simpliciter. In this sense, because it is only con-
cerned with the final product and not with the practice itself, craft does not seem to 
qualify as a virtue in quite the same sense as the other four intellectual virtues,32 or 
any of the moral virtues.
Moreover, virtues are directed to the best work of which agents or those agents’ 
powers are capable, as has been said above. But craft is only about lowly things and 
not about acting—and the agibilia—as is proper of prudentia and the moral virtues, 
nor about contemplating, as is proper of scientia, intellectus and sapientia (QNE VI 
8).33 In addition, craft acts on the factive intellect, which is also inferior in compari-
son to the active (or operative) and the speculative intellect to which those four other 
intellectual virtues are connected. Now, a virtue, understood as an excellence, ought 
not to be directed to the lowest or least worthy of our parts, but, instead, to our 
noblest part, the part by which we are named by metonymy (QNE VI 8).34 Once 
again, craft does not seem to qualify as a virtue in quite the same sense as them, for 
it only pertains to a lowly part of our intellect. As Buridan explains it,
To each singular human part or power that has a different operation a different virtue must 
be attributed, determining it to the ultimate work of which they are capable. For instance, 
one is the virtue of the eye, another one that of the hand. But no virtue of a part or of a 
particular power [of the human being] should be called a virtue of the whole absolutely, 
except for the virtue of the most principal part or of the most principal power. However, if 
the whole does not have powers distinct from the singular powers of the parts, then there is 
no problem in attributing the virtue of the most principal part to the whole, for, as Aristotle 
says in the ninth book [of the Nicomachean Ethics], “[as in] the state [the sovereign] seems 
to be the most important thing, so it is with man and with any other composite whole.”35 
Therefore, any one craft is a virtue, not of human beings as human beings, but belonging to 
the factive intellect, ordered to the object of its craft, just as the craft of building belongs to 
the building intellect, and likewise for [all] singular things. (QNE VI 8)36
32 To wit: prudentia, intellectus, scientia, and sapientia. See Buridan QNE VI 1.
33 “Item virtus hominis attenditur secundum maximum opus et optimum quod homo potest, sed 
optimum opus quod homo potest non est circa factibilia, circa quae est ars, sed vel circa agibilia, 
vel circa speculabilia, cum circa obiectum nobilius debeat esse opus nobilius et melius.”
34 “Item virtus alicuius non debet attendi secundum eius partem inferiorem vel viliorem, sed vel 
secundum se totum, vel secundum partem nobiliorem et excellentiorem a qua totum maxime 
natum est nominari. Sed intellectus factivus est pars inferior quam intellectus activus vel 
speculativus.”
35 Aristotle, NE 1168b.
36 “Dicam igitur quod singulis partibus vel potentiis in homine habentibus alias et alias operationes 
attribuendae sunt aliae et aliae virtutes proprie determinantes eas ad ultima opera in quae possunt: 
alia enim est virtus oculi, alia manus. Sed nulla virtus partis vel potentiae particularis deberet dicit 
virtus totius simpliciter, nisi virtus partis seu potentiae principalissimae. Si tamen totum non 
habeat potentiam distinctam a potentiis singularibus partium, tunc non est incoveniens virtutem 
partis principalissimae toti simpliciter attribuere, quia sicut dicit Aristoteles nono huius ‘quemad-
modum civitas principalissimum esse videtur, sic et homo et omnis alia congregatio.’ Igitur quae-
libet ars est virtus, non hominis secundum quod homo, sed intellectus factivi in ordine ad objectum 
illius artis, ut ars domificatoria intellectus domificativi, et sic de singulis.”
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Indeed, Buridan acknowledges that we ought not to say that the virtuous disposi-
tions which do not concern the whole human being but only particular parts (such 
as the eye or the hand) are habitus that make us good human beings simpliciter, 
except for when the part concerned is the main part, namely the contemplative intel-
lect in the case of humans. Hence, because craft refers to an inferior or less worthy 
part of our soul, i.e., the factive intellect, it does qualify as an intellectual virtue, 
only not a virtue of a human being as a human being. When we say that craft is a 
virtue, it is thus not a virtue of the human being as a whole, but a virtue of the factive 
intellect, and although it is not a virtue of humans “secundum quod homo” (Buridan, 
QNE VI 8),37 it is still a virtue.
This is a point where Buridan and Aquinas are at odds with one another. For 
Buridan, ars is somewhat a minor virtue because it is only a virtue of the factive 
intellect, and needs the aid of another virtue for it to count as a virtue of a human 
being qua human being. The virtues that have this supplementary role are either the 
moral virtues—i.e., the virtues pertaining to the appetitive part of the soul—or pru-
dence, which is the intellectual virtue acting as the manager of moral virtues.38 For 
Buridan, thus, there is a link between craft and the appetite, albeit not a necessary 
or determining one, as he makes clear in his reply to the third objection, when he 
says that “craft results in the good of the internal work of the factive intellect, but 
does not perfectly determine the external work, nor its appetite, to be directed to the 
good absolutely. Rather, to do that it requires a virtue, as has been said” (QNE VI 
8),39 and as will also be emphasized in Buridan’s response to the first objection, in 
Sect. 19.3.1 below. From Buridan’s point of view, although craft is a virtue of the 
internal work of the factive intellect (QNE VI 8),40 in order for it to be mainly asso-
ciated with the agent’s actual production—i.e., with the external things made or 
produced—and for it to be an operative habitus, it must be able to guide the external 
work of the factive intellect and, thence, engage with the appetite. In this sense, the 
Picardian master’s thesis entails that there is a normative, moral aspect added to 
craft, one which is most evidently seen through the work of prudence.41
For Aquinas, on the other hand, craft and the appetite are in no way related. 
According to him,
[craft] is nothing but “the right reason about certain works to be made.” And yet the good of 
these things depends, not on a human’s appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, 
but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is commendable, not for the 
37 See n. 31 above.
38 On the role of prudence as a manager of the appetitive virtues, see QNE VI 1.
39 “[…] ars reddit interius opus intellectus factivi bene se habens, sed non determinat perfecte opus 
exterius, nec ipsum appetitum ad simpliciter bene se habere, sed ad hoc indiget virtute ut dic-
tum est.”
40 “[…] propter quod Aristoteles vult quod ars reddit opus intellectus factivi bonum et bene se 
habens.”
41 Much has been written on Buridan’s notion of prudence. Since summarizing it here would go 
beyond the scope of this paper, I refer the reader to Saarinen (2003) and Korolec (1973, esp. 
pp. 43–92). See also Buridan QNE VI 18–20.
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will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Craft, therefore, properly 
speaking, is an operative habitus.42 (Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 57, a. 3, responsio; trans. 
1911–1925)43
According to the Doctor Angelicus, craft does not at all pertain to the appetite. It has 
no morally normative scope. The virtue of craft resides simply in one’s intellectual 
relation to the factibilia and has no bearing beyond the factive intellect. Aquinas 
expands on his own view, reinforcing the strict separation between ars and the appe-
titive power:
[Even if it is an operative or factive habitus, craft] has something in common with the 
speculative habitus: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of 
concern to them also, but not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object. 
For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his appetitive 
faculty may be affected, whether they be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in 
a craftsman, as we have observed. And so craft has the nature of a virtue in the same way as 
the speculative habitus, in so far, to wit, as neither craft nor speculative habitus makes a 
good work as regards the use of the habitus, which is the property of a virtue that perfects 
the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well. (Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 57, a. 3, 
responsio; trans. 1911–1925, with minor changes; my italics)
For the Angelic Doctor, thus, craft is a factive habitus which has in common with 
the speculative habitus—and is therefore considered amongst them—the fact that it 
makes it easier for the factive intellect to act promptly regarding its objects, but that 
is independent of the practical or moral consideration about that habitus being used 
in an optimal manner, one which perfects the appetite. For Buridan, however, you 
can have it both ways: craft can be an intellectual virtue and it can be relevant to the 
appetite, guiding it.44 This is precisely why, for the Picardian arts master, craft and 
prudence have this peculiar status among intellectual virtues in that although they 
originate in the intellect, both are said to be habituated in a way that is similar to the 
virtues of the appetite.45 In this broader sense, i.e., considered in its appetitive 
42 Although Aquinas seems to conflate operative and factive habitus here in the ST (following the 
conflation of intellectus agens and intellectus factivus), in his commentary on the Nicomachean 
Ethics he takes into account the distinction between the two, namely that the operative intellect 
deals with moral choices whereas the factive intellect, properly concerned with ars and with the 
habitus factivus, in dealing with the making of things, represents the lowest part of the intellect. Cf. 
Aquinas, Ethicorum ad Nicomachum, lib. VI, lectio III (1882, pp. 857–858).
43 “[…] ars nihil aliud est quam ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum. Quorum tamen bonum 
non consistit in eo quod appetitus humanus aliquo modo se habet, sed in eo quod ipsum opus quod 
fit, in se bonum est. Non enim pertinet ad laudem artificis, inquantum artifex est, qua voluntate 
opus faciat; sed quale sit opus quod facit. Sic igitur ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est.”
44 Through the external work of the factive intellect, which influences but does not perfectly deter-
mine the appetite. See n. 39 above.
45 Here, we must consider what Buridan says in QNE VI 1, where he divides virtues according to 
whether they are moral or intellectual: he argues that the former are virtues of the sensitive appetite 
requiring more practice and greater habituation; they are also more naturally inclinable or inclined 
to certain actions because they do not cognize. The latter, however, are virtues of the intellect and 
may require less repetition and habituation, as we sometimes promptly accept conclusions from a 
singular intellectual act. In the case of craft and prudence, however, unlike those of scientia, intel-
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 bearing and habituated in the manner of appetitive virtues, craft as a virtue of 
humans qua humans does not merely require that one put to work a certain skillset 
that follows the canon of a particular mechanical art, for instance, but that this skill-
set be put to work with right reason taken as a measure of good work in general, and 
not merely good craftsmanship. With this moral aspect aside—which only applies 
to a broad consideration of craft, understood in conjunction with a moral virtue or 
prudence—when we consider craft alone, in its purest sense, it is not only to be 
counted amongst virtues in general but, more specifically, as noted, amongst intel-
lectual virtues, because it originates in the human intellect. Thus, craft is a virtue of 
some sort, i.e., a virtue of the factive intellect, even if it cannot be stricto sensu 
labeled a virtue of human beings qua human beings.
19.3  Objections: Ars Does Not Seem to Be a Virtue
Buridan’s arguments seem compelling; yet, as is standard in late medieval question 
commentaries he must deal with proposed objections to his views. He presents sev-
eral reasons why craft does not seem to be a virtue. And although we now have a 
grasp of Buridan’s theses on the matter, we still ought to see how he can properly 
respond to the set of arguments presented in the beginning of his quaestio, which 
aim to deny that crafts are virtues.
19.3.1  Craft Is Not a Virtue; Craft Is Rather a Power
First,
It is argued that [craft] is not [a virtue], for in the second [book of the Nicomachean Ethics] 
it is said that “virtues are not affections nor powers”46 and in the ninth book of the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle says that “crafts are powers.”47 In fact, he says that “some of our 
lectus and sapientia, more practice and repetition seem to be required, as if they behaved like 
moral virtues. From this question, see also, and especially, the third objection and Buridan’s 
reponse to it, as well as this excerpt from his respondeo: “Quintum directivum [operum humano-
rum] sunt virtutes morales per assuetudinem inclinantes appetitum ad exsequendum id quod rati-
one decretum est et ad expectandum semper in suis motibus et operationibus iudicium rationis, sic 
enim nature consonant omnes nostre operationes. Ergo si assuetudo aliqua concurrat ad habituum 
intellectualium generationem et confirmationem, tamen non ex assuetudine principaliter generan-
tur, sed per experientiam vel doctrinam, propter quod habitus intellectuales non dicuntur morales. 
Sed contra, morales merito distinguuntur.”
46 Aristotle, NE 1105b–1106a.
47 Aristotle, Met. 1046b.
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powers are acquired through learning,”48 namely crafts [are acquired in this way]; therefore 
etc. (Buridan, QNE VI 8)49
According to the authority of Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (1105b), there 
seem to be three sorts of things in our intellect: affections, powers, and habitus, and 
a thing cannot be two of these at the same time. Considering that in Metaphysics 
1046b Aristotle is clear about the status of craft as a power, rather than an affection 
or a habitus, that means that craft is not a virtue, since virtue is a species of habi-
tus—namely, a praiseworthy habitus or settled disposition for acting well.50
To this first objection, Buridan replies that
It must be said that virtue is neither properly an affection nor a power, but is rather a disposi-
tion or habitus of a power determining that power to its best work. However, whenever the 
name “power” is used in a broad sense, extending it to the habitus or dispositions of true 
powers, then crafts as well as all virtues can be called powers, so indeed Aristotle says in 
the first book of the Rhetoric that “virtue is a power to acquire good things and a power to 
maintain and do many good things.”51 Or it must be said that, since virtues and vices are 
determinations of [our] powers directed toward opposite things, craft is called virtue insofar 
as it determines the factive intellect to judge truly about things that can be made. (QNE VI 8)52
A power, initially, can be directed to one of two opposites. But a craft always judges 
truly and well, so it is only directed toward truth and goodness. Because of that, 
craft cannot be considered a power, and it must rather be taken as a virtue. There is 
no such thing as a “bad craft” according to Buridan. Here, it may help to look at 
Aquinas’ consideration that
[…] when anyone endowed with a craft produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of 
that craft, in fact it is contrary to the craft: even as when a man lies, while knowing the 
truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. Wherefore, just 
as science has always a relation to good, as stated above, so it is with craft: and it is for this 
reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect virtue, because it does 
not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite, 
48 Aristotle, Met. 1046b.
49 “Arguitur quod non, quia secundo huius dicitur quod “virtutes nec sunt passiones nec potentiae” 
sed in nono Metaphysicae dicit Aristoteles ‘artes esse potentias.’ Dicit enim ‘aliquas potentiarum 
nobis esse acquisitas disciplinatu,’ scilicet artes. Ideo etc.”
50 See, e.g., Aristotle, Met. 1022b and NE 1103a.
51 Aristotle, Rhet. 1366a: “Virtue, it would seem, is a faculty of providing and preserving good 
things, a faculty productive of many and great benefits, in fact, of all things in all cases” 
(trans. 1926).
52 “Ad primam dicendum quod virtus nec est passio neque potentia proprie, sed est dispositio vel 
habitus potentiae determinans potentiam ad optimum eius opus. Quandoque tamen utimur large 
nomine potentiae, extendendo ipsum ad habitus vel dispositiones verarum potentiarum, et ita artes 
et omnes virtutes possunt dici potentiae, sic enim dicit Aristoteles primo Rhetoricae quod ‘virtus 
est potentia acquisitiva bonorum et servativa et potentia benefactiva multorum.’ Vel dicendum cum 
virtutes et maliciae sint determinationes potentiarum ad opposita se habentium, ars dicitur virtus 
inquantum determinat intellectum factivum ad vere iudicandum circa factibilia.”
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although there cannot be a good use without the craft. (ST I-II, q. 57, a. 3, ad 1; trans. 
1911–1925, with minor changes; my italics)53
Although we have seen excerpts where Buridan seems to disagree with Aquinas, 
they concur on the fact that craft itself cannot be ordered to a bad end. As opposed 
to what the objection suggests, bad workmanship is contrary to craft,54 and not the 
result of craft as a power which got swayed in the bad direction. What Buridan 
explains is that in its internal operation (as a virtue) craft always judges well and 
truly about the factibilia. If that internal act of judgment results in an equally good 
and truthful external operation, this creates a truth-oriented settled disposition (hab-
itus) of craft, i.e. once the intellect is directed and an act is accomplished, that act 
leaves a trace in the agent, disposing them to act in a similar manner in similar cir-
cumstances. That is, fundamentally, the work of a disposition, not that of a power. 
Now, insofar as it needs to judge truly internally, as has been said, and then put to 
work externally, Buridan will add in a way that is reminiscent of Aquinas’ excerpt 
above that craft requires the aid of a virtue:
But because—with respect to the external work—craft is directed toward opposite things, 
since, just as a doctor can heal through medical craft, a doctor can also kill, for that reason, 
crafts like these are called powers and require another virtue determining them to operate 
well absolutely, namely prudence or a moral virtue. Therefore, Aristotle rightly says that 
“there is [such a thing as] a virtue of craft.”55 (QNE VI 8; my italics)56
What Buridan is qualifying is that it is only with respect to its external work that 
craft is directed to opposites. But it is with respect to its internal work that it is called 
a virtue. Two different things are being referenced here. Buridan can thus qualify 
Aristotle’s assertion (Met. 1046b) that crafts are powers: properly speaking, crafts 
are habitus; they can, however, be called powers, in a less strict sense insofar as, by 
themselves and with respect to the external work, they can sway toward the good 
and the bad—just as medicine can be used to heal or to kill. It is in that sense that 
they require, as suggested by Aquinas, an additional virtue guiding it in accordance 
with right reason. In a certain sense, then, one could say there is a virtue of craft 
insofar as once its external work is aided by prudence or one of the moral virtues, 
the agent becomes disposed to act in one way.
53 “[…] cum aliquis habens artem operatur malum artificium, hoc non est opus artis, immo est 
contra artem, sicut etiam cum aliquis sciens verum mentitur, hoc quod dicit non est secundum 
scientiam, sed contra scientiam. Unde sicut scientia se habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est, ita 
et ars, et secundum hoc dicitur virtus. In hoc tamen deficit a perfecta ratione virtutis, quia non facit 
ipsum bonum usum, sed ad hoc aliquid aliud requiritur, quamvis bonus usus sine arte esse non 
possit.”
54 See also Aristotle, NE 1140a.
55 Aristotle, NE 1140b.
56 “Sed quia in ordine ad opus exterius ars se habet ad opposita, quoniam sicut per artem medicinae 
medicus potest sanare, ita potest interficere, ideo artes ut sic vocantur potentiae et indigent ad 
simpliciter bene operandum alia virtute determinante eas, videlicet prudentia aut morali virtute; 
ideo enim bene dicit Aristoteles quod ‘artis erat virtus.’”
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19.3.2  Craft Is Not a Virtue, Because Craft Is 
Sometimes Forbidden
Another characteristic of virtues in general, according to the objections, besides 
their being strictly distinct from intellectual powers and affections, is that “no virtue 
should be forbidden, since virtue perfects the one who has it and makes their work 
good” (Buridan, QNE VI 8);57 for why would anyone want to impose a limitation on 
virtue and, therefore, impede the excellence in the appropriate performance of an 
activity? “Some crafts, however, are forbidden” (QNE VI 8),58 Buridan notes. Here, 
we can think of witchcraft or necromancy as sorts of crafts which were prohibited 
or strictly limited in the Middle Ages. If there are cases where we set limits to cer-
tain crafts or even forbid that they be exercised, and if virtues ought not to be cur-
tailed or deliberately prohibited, this must be an indication that craft is not a virtue.
To this second objection, Buridan replies that
No craft is forbidden on account of their being virtues, namely on account of their being 
things determining the intellect to true judgment, but [craft is forbidden] because we can 
use it badly through our badness with regards to external operations. Therefore, crafts are 
not restrained on account of their being virtues, but rather on account of our badness, lest 
we be armed with them, for “injustice armed is at its harshest,” [as Aristotle says] in the first 
book of the Politics.59 (QNE VI 8)60
Restrictions are not imposed on crafts as virtues per se, for, as we have seen, there 
is no such thing as a “bad craft.” Limits are set, instead, to whatever might impel 
humans to act in a vicious or malicious manner. For instance, if we must set limits 
to the practice of medicine, it is not because the craft that is the virtue resulting from 
the practice of medicine might be bad, but rather because this practice, if misused in 
a practical, moral sense, might end up being harmful; and its habitus might end up 
leaving a trace on the individual, inclining them to doings that tend to evil rather 
than the good, creating, rather, a vice. What we are limiting, thus, when we impose 
restrictions on craft, is not the intellectual virtue itself, but rather the human behav-
iour, i.e., the external operation, which has a moral scope and which could lead to 
moral vice.
Unlike the case of medicine which can be used for either good or evil, if mantic 
activities are understood, as they were in the late Middle Ages, not as activities in 
57 “Item nullae virtutes debent prohiberi, cum virtus habentem perficiat et opus eius bonum red-
dat […].”
58 “[…] sed aliquae artes prohibentur.”
59 Aristotle, Pol. 1253a.
60 “Ad aliam dicendum quod nullae artes prohibentur ea. ratione qua sunt virtutes, scilicet determi-
nantes intellectum ad verum iudicium, sed ea. ratione qua possumus eis male uti quoad operationes 
exteriores per nostram maliciam. Non igitur propter se prohibentur, sed propter nostram maliciam, 
ne eis armemur. ‘Saevissima enim est iniustitia habens arma,’ primo Politicae.”
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which one should strive for excellence61 but rather as activities to be avoided at all 
costs (as, e.g., the 1277 condemnations suggest), this means that witchcraft is a craft 
in name only and not in its true sense of a virtue; thus, following what has been said 
in Sect. 19.3.1 above, just like necromancy, fortune-telling, incantations etc., it is 
actually contrary to craft and ought to be forbidden.
19.3.3  Craft Does Not Perfect the Activity
Moreover, a third objection suggests, according to Aristotle, that
“Each virtue, at any rate has a [twofold effect] on the thing to which it belongs: it perfects 
the one who has it and makes them do their work well,”62 [as is said] in the second book [of 
the Nicomachean Ethics]. But craft does not make it so that someone performs their func-
tion well; rather, it causes them to produce good work. In fact, through building a builder 
makes a house in itself good and firm, even though they sometimes act badly, for [they 
sometimes act] toward a bad end. It has been said in the preceding question that it is some-
times the case that a certain effect is had following craft, and [acting] against prudence. 
(Buridan, QNE VI 8)63
So, virtues dispose us to carry out our doings and makings in a good manner, mean-
ing that virtues dispose us to two kinds of things: (i) to good action as an activity, 
and (ii) to good work as an effect of that activity. But craft does not seem to comply 
with the first kind of disposition. It seems to produce good work, in the sense that it 
can cause the final product of the work to be good—but that says nothing about the 
manner in which that work has been carried out. Craft, unlike virtue, whose value 
depends on the agent and on how an activity is brought about, is valued for its result-
ing work, the products of its making. We can use craft to aptly perform actions aim-
ing at bad ends, or we can use craft to carry out actions while, for instance, 
disregarding the counsel of prudence or ignoring the recta ratio. That is why we call 
someone who builds firm and good houses a skilled housebuilder (i.e., skilled or 
virtuous with regards to the ars domificatoria) regardless, e.g., of their occasionally 
(or often) acting in a bad manner from a moral standpoint. In those cases, craft does 
not seem to dictate anything at all about how one acts or ought to act, or about how 
an activity is to be carried out; it only refers to the final product of the activity. We 
can also think of a skilled proponent of the ars oratoria, writing an undeserved 
encomium. The writing can be considered good in the sense that it conforms to the 
61 In fact, they are often conceived as activities meant to compel us and drive us to error when we 
would not otherwise err.
62 Aristotle, NE 1106a.
63 “Item ‘omnis virtus, cuius utique fuerit virtus, et illud bene habens perficit et opus eius bene red-
dit,’ secundo huius, sed ars non reddit opus bene, sed bonum: domificator enim per autem domifi-
catoriam facit domum in se bonam et firmam, qui tamen aliquando male agit, quia ad malum 
finem. Dictum enim fuit in quaestione praecedenti quod aliquando contingit eundem effectum fieri 
secundum artem, et contra prudentiam.”
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rules of good prose composition (grammar, syntax, style etc.) and that it manages to 
leave its recipient with a sense of satisfaction, self-confidence and self-respect, 
albeit false. The work of the craft as an effect has thus been achieved; but we can 
still say the orator has acted badly, for flattery would hardly be considered a good 
thing, one to which we ought to aspire and be disposed to. In writing undeserved 
accolades, possibly for some ulterior benefit, the writer is likely acting against the 
counsel of prudence or against some moral virtue (to wit, justice and truthfulness). 
In that sense, craft does not seem to qualify as a virtue according to the conditions 
proposed by Aristotle (EN 1105a), namely that the agent act with knowledge, and 
deliberately choose the action for itself (and not, say, in light of some ulterior gain, 
nor by coercion), and that the action come from some sort of settled disposition.
Buridan’s reply to the third objection has been explained in the previous section 
when, in opposition to Aquinas’ understanding of the role of craft in the intellect 
and its absolute separation from the appetite, we described Buridan’s conception of 
how craft operates in the internal and external work of the factive intellect, and how 
it can, through another virtue (and by affecting the appetite), be transferred over into 
external matter.64 What is worth adding here is that craft is necessary but not suffi-
cient to direct us, as human beings, to the good absolutely, in that humans are not 
merely beings of intellection and activity, but also of production, in the sense that 
we all at least occasionally engage in makings and creations that involve craft, even 
if we are not all craftspeople.65 In order to do that, as the responses to the objections 
above have suggested, craft requires something else, another virtue, to actually 
guide it, externally, towards its good end. That is to say that if the external work 
perfectly conforms to the internal work of the factive intellect, a disposition could 
be formed in the agent, prompting them to act in a similar manner in similar circum-
stances. However, the external work does not necessarily conform to the internal 
work. In fact, there are cases where the external work is not fully virtuous even if it 
conforms to the internal work, such as the case of the construction worker building 
a concentration camp, and the rhetorician writing an undeserved encomium. In 
these examples, the internal work dictates how these things ought to be done, and 
the external work may or may not follow it. If it does, that is only a guarantee that 
the product of the action is technically good, i.e., respectively, that the building is 
sturdy and the speech indeed praises its addressee; but if the external work is not 
accompanied by the appropriate moral virtue (or by prudence), the act itself is not 
fully virtuous or fully good, as we can clearly see to be the case for the building of 
the concentration camp (whose end is an evil) and the writing of the undeserved 
encomium (whose end is an instance of injustice). This is because the ultimate good 
aimed at in the operations of a virtuous agent comes from their moral judgment, and 
not merely from the operations of the factive intellect. So, a certain understanding 
64 For Buridan’s text, see n. 39 above.
65 Here, we must also recall that ars comprises not only building crafts but also medicine, rhetoric, 
dialectic, etc., as mentioned in Sect. 19.1 above. Hence, in our production of certain speeches and 
some kinds of reasoning we employ craft, even if we are not craftspeople in the contemporary 
sense of the term.
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of the moral good must accompany the agent’s reasoning in cases of virtuous 
actions—and this is the sense in which craft requires a virtue. However, craft is still 
a key, necessary virtue, in that no skilled work can be performed by another virtue 
alone, without craft.
19.3.4  Craft Does Not Make a Person Good Absolutely
This is how we come to the fourth objection presented in Buridan’s quaestio:
“A human virtue is that according to which a human being is called a good human being,”66 
as is clear in the second book [of the Nicomachean Ethics], but a human being is not said to 
be good according to craft, for many craftsmen are rather bad human beings. (QNE VI 8)67
Beyond the case of the rhetorician, mentioned above, in Sect. 19.3.3, this is clearly 
observed in the case of skilled craftsmen and ingenious people, who are considered 
good in relation to the things they make and produce, but who are not necessarily 
seen as good people absolutely, or are even seen as bad people overall, for the way 
they act in general. It would seem that they might be good secundum quid, i.e., spe-
cifically pertaining to that one aspect in which they are skilled, but not good simplic-
iter, i.e. absolutely, concerning the whole of their being human. Thus, again, the 
craft or skillset by which we can be called good at something but not a good person 
in general does not seem to meet the threshold of virtue. Suffice it to think of Phidias 
and, on the one hand, his statue of Zeus at Olympia, considered one of the seven 
wonders of the ancient world, and, on the other, his alleged theft of gold and sup-
posed impiety.68 Although Phidias might be portrayed as an extremely skilled or 
virtuous sculptor, it does not seem to be the case that he would be called a virtuous 
human being. Thus, according to this line of reasoning, craft cannot qualify as 
a virtue.
In his reply to the fourth argument, Buridan recalls that it has been “rightly 
show[n] that craft is not a virtue of human beings as human beings” (QNE VI 8),69 
as we have seen in Sect. 19.2.2. Craft must then be understood merely as a virtue of 
the factive intellect and not as a virtue of humans qua humans.
66 Aristotle, NE 1106a.
67 “Item ‘virtus hominis est secundum quam homo dicitur bonus homo’ ut patet secundo huius, sed 
homo non dicitur secundum artem bonus homo, quia multi artifices sunt valde mali homines.”
68 The accounts of the accusations made against Phidias and of their legitimacy vary, but here they 
are taken at face-value for the sake of the example.
69 “Alia ratio bene probat quod ars non est virtus hominis secundum quod homo.”
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19.3.5  If There Is a “Virtue of Craft,” Craft Itself Is Not 
a Virtue
Now, even if we were to grant, on account of what has been said above, that craft is 
not really a virtue, we could still say that there is a certain virtue of craft, in the sense 
that a virtue could accidentally belong to craft. That is to say, although the condi-
tions as to what counts as a virtue proposed by Aristotle are not necessarily fulfilled 
by craft, they could be fulfilled in specific instances of craft, when a virtue is added 
to it. But then the last of the objections faced by Buridan surfaces, for although 
Aristotle says that there is a virtue of craft (NE 1140b), he also says that “there is no 
virtue of a virtue, for this would go on infinitely” (Buridan, QNE VI 8);70 thus, craft 
cannot qualify as a virtue. This objection tracks an objection found in Aquinas’ 
treatment of the issue: “[…] there is no virtue of a virtue. But ‘there is a virtue of 
craft,’ according to the Philosopher. Therefore, craft is not a virtue” (ST I-II, q. 57, 
a. 3 (objection 2); trans. 1911–1925, with minor changes). Since Aristotle claims 
that there cannot be a virtue of a virtue, as this would lead to an infinite regress, and 
since he also claims that there is indeed a virtue of craft, that is an indication that 
craft cannot be a virtue.
In response to this final objection, the Picardian arts master says, recalling and 
expanding on a key aspect from his reply to the first objection, that
There is no virtue of craft insofar as craft is itself a virtue, but rather [there is a virtue of 
craft] insofar as it determines the intellect to true judgment. But craft surely requires a vir-
tue with respect to external work, so that it is ordered to the good end, for in this way it 
could be ordered to opposites, and [in this way] it has more the mode of a power than that 
of a virtue, as has been said. (QNE VI 8)71
As we have seen, with respect to its internal work, craft guides the intellect to judge 
truly. In that sense, it is a virtue; and because, indeed, there is no virtue of a virtue, 
in that same sense, one cannot say there is a virtue of craft. However, when its exter-
nal work is concerned, craft needs another (moral or practical) virtue, so that it can 
be ordered to the good. With regards to its external work, in its being able to waver 
between opposites, craft acts as a power, as it were; and it is in that sense that one 
could say that there is a virtue of craft, as this would be somewhat tantamount to 
saying that there is a virtue of a power, which would not entail the infinite regress 
denounced by the objection. And thus we come to the end of the objections and 
responses to them.
70 “Item virtutis non est virtus, quia sic procederetur in infinitum, sed artis est virtus, ut dicit 
Aristoteles.”
71 “Ad ultimam dicendum est quod artis non est virtus in quantum ipsa est virtus, sed in quantum 
determinat intellectum ad verum iudicium, sed bene indiget virtute quoad opus exterius, ad hoc 
quod ordinetur ad bonum finem, quia sic erat oppositorum, et magis habeat modum potentiae 
quam virtutis, ut dictum est.”
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19.4  Concluding Remarks: Ars Sive Scientia or Ars 
Sine Scientia?
We now turn to the question as to why ars seems to have been overlooked in current 
scholarship on medieval philosophy. Part of the reason seems to be the very status 
craft had back in the Middle Ages. Indeed, all of the above having been established, 
we are left with an account that presents craft seemingly as a “threshold virtue,” as 
it were. Craft is seen as a lesser virtue for at least two reasons: it ranks lower because 
it is a practical virtue, not a theoretical or contemplative virtue; and between the two 
practical virtues—namely, prudence and craft—craft also seems to rank lower. The 
justification for this appears to be standardly understood by scholastics, and is 
expressed in Ockham’s (c. 1287–1347) thought:
[…] the craft of building a house does not dictate that the house should be built, but that the 
house ought to be so composed from wood and stone or arranged in such-and-such a way. 
And accordingly it gives direction insofar as, if the house is built, it directs the builder to 
build it in such-and-such a way. (Ockham, Rep 3.12, OT VI 420.7–10; trans. in Matthew 
Dee 2019; my emphasis)72
So, while prudence can answer the question regarding whether a certain thing ought 
to be done, craft can only guide how it ought to be done, once it is established by 
considerations beyond those of craft that it ought to be done.73 And it is thus also for 
Buridan, as we have seen: although craft is confirmed as an intellectual virtue by his 
reasoning, its role seems to be somewhat limited, as it is treated as a virtue of the 
factive intellect, and one which concerns the factibilia, which have a lesser standing 
than the objects of our practical deliberations and of theoretical contemplation.
Now, why would anyone, especially medieval philosophers, go to all this trouble 
of saving the status of craft as a virtue? The fact that Aristotle had counted it among 
the five intellectual virtues does bear some weight on Buridan’s reasoning, just as it 
did for other scholastics—hence Aquinas’ similar defense of craft as an intellectual 
virtue. But what is at stake here is the coherence of the scheme of intellectual vir-
tues, so this is not simply a one-off defense of craft as a virtue. While the principles 
admitted in speculative sciences are either (i) intellectually (self-)evident principles 
known by the intellect through its natural light when it considers the meaning of the 
terms (Buridan, QNE VI 11), i.e. the principle of non-contradiction and the princi-
ple of identity, or (ii) principles known by means of the experience of many princi-
ples that cannot be known otherwise, or yet (iii) principles that are known by a 
process of reasoning, by deducing conclusions from principles (QNE VI 1),74 the 
72 “Exemplum: ars faciendi domum non dictat quod domus sit facienda, sed quod domus debet 
componi ex lignis et lapidibus sic vel sic dispositis. Et ita dirigit quatenus, si domus fiat, dirigit 
facientem ut sic vel sic faciat.”
73 Details of this distinction are found in Ockham’s division of practical knowledge into ostensive 
and dictative, as seen in: Ord., Prol. Q. 11 (OT I, 316.8–317.2).
74 “Alii autem dixerunt quod habitus intellectuales non generantur in nobis ex assuetudine, sed ex 
naturali inclinatione intellectus ad intelligibile quantum ad principia omnino prima, vel per expe-
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principles admitted in practical sciences are not self-evident, and they require sen-
sible experience and memory (QNE VI 1 and 9). These non-self-evident principles 
pertain to craft, prudence, and also to some speculative sciences. But unlike specu-
lative knowledge, which can rely solely on evident principles or necessarily deduc-
ible conclusions, craft must do some internal work of synthesis from experience. 
According to Aristotle (Met. 981a), experience is able to merge many particular 
perceptions into one experience and gain knowledge of individual cases, all while 
merely seeing these individual cases as such and not exceeding their particularity. 
As Schneider puts it:
[Craft] recognizes, for the first time, proceeding from the similarities of observations [of 
particulars], what is generally inherent in them; thus, it is able to structure cases by kinds 
and has a λόγος—here, one may full well say “concept”—which allows for the subsump-
tion of similar cases; even cases which are similar only in certain respects. It is only at this 
stage that the general is recognized in the many individuals, and the emancipation from 
immediate perception opens up the possibility of theorizing. (1994, p. 173; my translation)75
The properly contemplative, properly genetically intellectual side of ars, insofar as 
it pertains to the utmost rational part of the soul, is begotten from its ability to con-
ceptualize (i.e., acquire a so-called universal) based on particular occurrences. 
Craft, thus, is not simply a routine repetition of an act, but entails a certain form of 
cognition, whence its status as an intellectual virtue:
Aristotle speaks of a real “knowledge” in this context for the first time when he considers 
the “architects,” those who employ τέχνη [i.e., craft], to be comparatively “wiser” with 
regards to those craftspeople whose actions are based merely on experience; [the former] 
are called wiser not because they know how to approach a given case better—this is not 
always the case and it is often not the case when dealing with individual cases—but rather 
because they have the λόγος and know the causes. (Schneider 1994, p. 173; my translation)76
So even though craft may seem like a minor virtue amongst intellectual virtues—for 
it is concerned with factibilia and the factive intellect, rather than with all that is 
rientiam quantum ad multa principia que aliter sciri non possunt, vel per doctrinam ratiocinativam 
deducendo conclusiones ex principiis […].”
75 “[…] sie erstmals von den Ähnlichkeiten der Beobachtungen ausgehend deren Allgemeines 
erkennt; damit vermag sie Fälle nach Arten zu gliedern und verfügt über einen λόγος—hier darf 
man wohl ‘Begriff’ sagen—der die Subsumption artgleicher, mithin bloss in bestimmter Hinsicht 
ähnlicher Fälle erlaubt. Erst auf dieser Stufe wird an dem vielen Einzelnen das Allgemeine erkannt, 
und mit der Emanzipation von der unmittelbar gegebenen Wahrnehmung wird die Möglichkeit der 
Theoriebildung eröffnet.”
76 “Auch von einem wirklichen ‘Wissen’ spricht Aristoteles in diesem Zusammenhang erstmals, 
wenn er die ‘Architekten,’ diejenigen, die über die τέχνη verfügen, gegenüber den Handwerkern, 
deren Tun bloß auf Erfahrung beruht, für vergleichweise ‘weiser’ hält; und nicht weil sie einen 
gegebenen Fall besser, erfolgreicher anzugehen wüßten, heißen sie ‘weiser’—das muß keineswegs 
immer so sein und ist es ausdrücklich gerade beim Handeln, das auf den Einzelfall zielt, oftmals 
nicht—, sondern weil sie über den λόγος verfügen und die Ursachen kennen.”
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proper to the practical and speculative intellects,77—it is still important insofar as it 
has something in common with speculative habits, as noted above.
Although both Aquinas and Buridan deal with the question of whether craft is a 
virtue, Buridan’s treatment of this question merits consideration when compared to 
Aquinas’ mainly on two grounds. First, it is significantly longer than Aquinas’: 
while the Doctor Angelicus only raises three objections to his view in his quaestio, 
Buridan raises five and proceeds to offer us a sturdier thesis, which is capable of 
accounting for all of them. Furthermore, Buridan’s reply to the question includes 
more detail about this virtue and how it finds its seat in the intellect. Second and 
most importantly, the Picardian arts master also gives craft a broader scope than 
Aquinas does, allowing its influence to extend beyond the realm of the factive intel-
lect to reach the appetite.
Hence, a first answer to the question as to why craft seems to have been over-
looked since the Middle Ages when compared to the other virtues emerges from the 
discussion above, and the weight it is given by different medieval philosophers: 
even if ars is a virtue, it is not a virtue of humans qua humans independent of other 
virtues; and, more importantly, because it concerns factibilia, and not contempla-
tion, it ranks lower (or lowest, one might argue) within our philosophical hierarchy. 
But there is more to this discussion than meets the unsuspecting eye. That sapientia 
and prudentia both deserve special places on the podium of virtues seems uncontro-
versial due to their status as, respectively, a purely contemplative virtue, synony-
mous with philosophy itself, and the manager of moral virtues. Intellectus, in turn, 
being the habitus of first principles,78 is also warranted a prominent position. But 
what of ars and scientia? Why should the latter have precedence over the former for 
medieval philosophers?79
This sort of primacy of scientia over ars, against common belief, is not some-
thing that arises in modernity, nor with the advent of the Renaissance. The medieval 
discussion we find on what the terms refer to and how they were interpreted diver-
gently in different contexts can actually be traced back to the Early Middle Ages 
(Włodek 1994, p. 57). Later, in the fourteenth century, we eventually come to Jean 
Mignot’s adage that “ars sine scientia nihil est” (apud Robert 2017, p. 35), which, 
despite not always applying particularly strongly to the philosophical discussion of 
that time (see Robert 2017), does count as a representation of how craft was gener-
ally perceived.80 As Lafleur notes (1994, p. 55), already in the thirteenth century, 
77 Here we must also recall that Buridan had paraphrased Aristotle, in the very beginning of QNE I 
1, to remind us that “nobilis et excellens est virtutum speculatio adhuc multo nobilior et multo 
melior est virtutem operatio.”
78 Cf. Aristotle, NE 1141a6–8 and, e.g., Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 50 a. 4 and Buridan QNE VI 11.
79 This question concerning the separation and ranking of ars and scientia would also be particu-
larly relevant to current philosophical debates, since technology and science, in our current under-
stading of those terms, are not only ubiquitous but also seem to go hand in hand in our society, one 
necessarily depending on the other.
80 However, contra Robert (2017), I suggest that we not only consider what kind of treatment ars is 
given but how often it is taken as an object of study in the Middle Ages.
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e.g., in the Philosophica Disciplina of 1245 written by an anonymous Parisian arts 
master, the frequency of use of “ars” and “scientia” carried some weight. Whereas 
the latter is found recurrently throughout that work, the former is seldom present, 
except in set phrases, serving mainly two purposes: in one sense, such as in the 
expression “ars dicendi,” it connotes a weaker epistemological status than scientia; 
in another, when used in expressions such as “artes liberales,” it is supposed to 
denote more rigour (especially once physics, metaphysics and poetics were added 
to the liberal arts), which would therefore legitimize the role of the magister artium 
in the university.
Just as it may seem obvious to us, albeit merely intuitively—and perhaps unjus-
tifiably so—that craft and (scientific) knowledge are not the same thing, this distinc-
tion also did not seem to be a particularly tricky one for Buridan either, for he only 
dedicates a short section to it:
One could raise a question about how knowledge (scientia) will be able to differ from craft 
(ars) and prudence (prudentia), when knowledge is allowed to be about contingent things, 
just as craft and prudence? I reply that although knowledge deals with external contingent 
things, yet in another way it is also concerned with non-contingent conclusions and propo-
sitions and things […]. And craft and prudence are about contingent conclusions and from 
contingent propositions, namely those which could be otherwise, or others which could be 
false. The physician concludes that this patient must not drink tomorrow, and this conclu-
sion turns out to be false. Therefore, he will conclude the opposite, and will give him wine 
because of the variety of the matter and of the circumstances of the singular, which the 
craftsperson and the prudent person ought to consider, but not the knowledgeable person 
and the wise person. (QNE VI 6)81
We can see that this issue concerning the distinction between ars and scientia 
emerges in the sixth question of the QNE, two questions prior to the one concerning 
ars as an intellectual virtue. Although scientia may deal with contingent things, it is 
not necessary that it do. The artes—and also prudentia, for that matter—necessarily 
deal with contingents. Thus, ars concerns lesser things in the hierarchy of beings, 
because it is about less difficult, more readily accessible things than those dealt with 
by scientia, intellectus and sapientia (which are based on principles). Nevertheless, 
ars is actually concerned with a wider array of things considered in light of general 
guidelines, and a thoroughly specific account of it and all of the contingent factibilia 
and facienda it entails is impossible to give. This could be one of the reasons why 
relatively little attention is given to craft as an intellectual virtue, and only a cursory 
treatment of it seems to suffice for the purposes of the QNE.
81 “Sed adhuc aliquis poterit dubitare, quomodo scientia poterit ab arte et prudentia differe, cum 
ipsa concedatur versari circa res contingentes, sicut ars et prudentia? Respondeo quod licet scientia 
sit de rebus extra contingentibus, est tamen de conclusionibus et propositionibus non contingenti-
bus aliter se habere … Ars autem et prudentia sunt de conclusionibus contingentibus et ex propo-
sitionibus contingentibus, scilicet quas contingit alibi, vel alias esse falsas. Concludit enim medicus 
modo quod iste infirmus non debet bibere cras, haec conclusio erit falsa. Ideo concludet opposi-
tum, et dabit ei vinum propter varietatem materiae et circumstantiarum singularium quas oportet 
considerare artificem et prudentem, non autem scientem et sapientem.”
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Thus, late medieval philosophers appear to have had at least two reasons to allot 
less scholarly effort and/or fewer quaestiones to craft as compared to the other intel-
lectual virtues. First, craft is considered a lower virtue because of its scope, dealing 
with the most mundane things of which humans are capable (i.e., production), 
which are situated at the polar opposite of the divine things to which we ought to 
aspire in our quest for eudaimonia (the ultimate aim of the Ethics). Second, pre-
cisely because those mundane things are, by definition, contingent, the scope of 
craft is also infinitely wide and complicated, for even things which appear similar 
can be contingently unique, which indicates that it would be impossible for any 
philosopher to provide an exhaustive account of the virtue craft. And, even if such 
an endeavour were possible, it would be a gargantuan task to undertake on behalf of 
such an “inferior” virtue.
While ars might still need a suitable rehabilitation by looking at other philoso-
phers’ accounts of it so that its role in the “pantheon of virtues” can be properly 
restored, the examination above has hopefully shown that this subject is worth pur-
suing—if not for itself, then at least insofar as it may help give us a broader under-
standing of late medieval virtue theory, and possibly even enlighten our current 
understanding of the relationship between craft and (scientific) knowledge as they 
pertain to our development and use of technology and how each of them is or ought 
to be connected in any way to the good, be it in an epistemic or moral sense.
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